Seigniorage, its history, its present, and its future for the European Union by Leen, A.R.
Source: A.R. Leen, 'Seigniorage, its history, its present, and its future for the European Union', Archives of 
Economic History, Volume XXIII, No 1, January-June 2011, pp. 7-16.  
 
SEIGNIORAGE: A NEW REVENUE FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
 
ABSTRACT Seigniorage, the government’s revenue from the creation of money, has 
been a source of finance for countries from the past to the present. The article focuses on 
the future of it as a new way to finance the budget of the European Union. Seigniorage, 
as generated by the euro, can provide for at least a quarter of the present budget. It can 
be called a veritable own resource (revenue) of the Union; for the countries of the 
eurozone, seigniorage is generated by a policy-driven common EU policy.  
After stating the unique EU character, the substantial income, and the easy and 
fraud-free collection of seigniorage, the article looks at the institutional, legal, and 
practical difficulties that have to be tackled with the introduction of it as new revenue 
(EU tax) for the Union. The article concludes with an overall assessment of seigniorage 
in view of the present EU budget reform. Though no one-way bet, seigniorage is, at least 
on equal footing with the two, at present, by the Union preferred new EU taxes: a 
financial transaction tax and an EU VAT.  
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In 2006, the European Commission started the discussion about a fundamental reform of 
the EU budget. The Commission (2010a, 2011a) plans the introduction of one or more 
EU taxes. A European tax should not add weight to the fiscal burden of European citizens, 
but it should represent a more appropriate mode of financing the EU insofar as a Union of 
States and citizens is concerned. For the European Parliament (EP), the requirement that 
the European Commission put the introduction of EU taxes on the agenda was a sine qua 
non to its approval for this year’s budget. European taxes should be a part of the 
upcoming seven-year multiannual financial framework that starts in 2014. 
Though every present source of revenue of the EU is, by definition, called an own 
resource---the EU knows better (Ehlermann 1982). In fact, only the custom duties, 
including agricultural levies, that are collected at the borders of the EU are true own 
resources. Their yield ‘naturally’ accrues to the Union (European Commission 2004). 
They generate 15 percent of the revenue of the EU. The other 85 percent consists of, 
grosso modo, contributions by the Member States based on their Gross National Product 
(GNP). Both two traditional own resources, were in the beginning of the seventies of the 
last century the first and the second really EU own resources. They are the most complete 
expression of the financial autonomy of the EU. National custom authorities do withheld 
them and transfer them directly to the Union. This is done without any mediation of the 
national treasuries and after a deduction of a fee for the Member State of collection. Both 
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revenues are linked to European policies: the creation of one internal market and food 
security. 
For the EU, the goal of the introduction of new EU taxes is to get a greater 
autonomy from the Member States; the EU speaks about the need for true own resources. 
At present, expenditures with a real European added-value are under-supplied because 
they go under-financed. For Member States, of relevance is not the answer to the question: 
What does the EU achieve with its expenditures? It is the answer to the question: What 
do we give and what do we get in return? The cursed juste retour thinking (Pietras 2008; 
Richter 2008) that goes hand-in-hand with the direct contributions, has a destructive 
effect on policies with an added value for the EU, e.g., energy security, European 
infrastructure, and a knowledge-led service economy. Member States tend to favor 
instruments with geographically pre-allocated financial envelopes rather than those that 
may warrant a greater EU added value. 
 The aim of the paper is to show that seigniorage, the government’s revenue from 
the creation of money, can be a solution to the reform of the EU budget. Seigniorage, as 
an old source of government income, can become the new veritable own resource the 
Union wants. It has been a source of government finance for most of the countries in the 
world. For the countries of the eurozone, a real common EU policy generates seigniorage; 
just as the present two traditional own resources are the result of a common EU policy, 
and for that same reason belong to the EU. For the EU, in the past, seigniorage has 
always been an important candidate for a new own resource. At present, at best, it 
receives some lip service (European Commission, 2011b).  
The article is structured as follows. After the introduction, the concept of 
seigniorage is explained. Next, the article gives an historical overview of the discussions 
of the possibility of seigniorage for financing the EU budget. After stating a general 
problem in the assessment that seigniorage shares with all the other possible new EU 
taxes, a specific assessment follows of seigniorage as a new own resource of the Union. 
First, on the positive side, the unique EU character, the substantial income, and the easy, 
fraud-free collection of seigniorage are discussed. Next, on the negative side, the article 
looks at the institutional, legal, and practical problems that have to be tackled with its 
introduction. The article gives a special emphasis to the perceived loss of autonomy of 
the European Central Bank (ECB). The article concludes with an appraisal of seigniorage 
as compared to the two, at present, preferred new EU taxes: a financial transaction tax 




In the middle ages, seigniorage, also spelled ‘seignorage’ or ‘seigneurage’, was a 
prerogative of the crown whereby it claimed a percentage upon the bullion brought to the 
mint to be coined or to be exchanged for coin (Black 1992). Individuals with precious 
metal could take it to the government, and, for a fee called brassage, the government’s 
mint would stamp a coin out of the metal so it could be used in commerce. Seigniorage 
became such a lucrative source of income that seigneurs often mandated yearly recoinage: 
renovatio monetae. The circulating coins were declared to have lost their legal tender; it 
was required that, e.g., taxes were to be made in a new coin. In England, after the year 
1000 over a period of 150 years, rulers changed their coinage at least 53 times (Desan 
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2011). Seigniorage is also a type of revenue governments earn because of their monopoly 
power over the production of currency. 
 The average reliance of governments all over the world, measured as the ratio of 
seigniorage revenue to governmental expenditures, varied, e.g., for the period 1965-94 
from a minimum of 1% to a maximum of nearly 31% (Haslag and Bhattacharya 1999). In 
Europe, it was on average a little above 5 percent in the sixties and seventies of the last 
century (Klein and Neumann 1990). As a percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for 
the period 1971-1990 for countries in Western Europe it was about 0.5 percent (Click 
1998, Gros 1993; cp Cukrowski and Stavrev 2001; Hochreiter, Rovelli, and Winckler 
1996).   
In modern days, the returns to the government from the issue of currency are 
three-fold. Firstly, it is the difference between the face value of a coin or banknote and its 
production costs. The difference between the face value of paper money and its marginal 
printing cost are almost equal to the face value of the note---marginal printing costs are 
effectively zero (Buiter 2007). The cost of printing banknotes in the U.S. is estimated to 
be about four cents for a newly printed banknote (Barro and Stevenson 1997).1  
Secondly, it consists on the returns of the investments of the balances commercial 
banks have to hold at their National Central Banks (NCBs) as a counterpart to the total 
amount of banknotes in circulation. In the eurozone the amount of banknotes in 
circulation is over 800 billion euro.  
Thirdly, it is the economic disadvantage suffered by a holder of cash, due to the 
effects of expansionary monetary policy. In the long run, inflation is mainly the result of 
the excess issue of money over and above the amount equal and necessary to finance the 
growth in trade. Essentially, inflation is a form of indirect income tax, since it causes a 
decline in the purchasing power of the public’s income (Masson, Savastano, and Sharma 
1998; Scott 1997). The main purpose of an inflation tax is financing government 
expenditures. 
In general, the differences between countries of seigniorage relative to other 
sources of government revenue can be explained by looking at seigniorage as a form of 
taxation. Countries with a more unstable and polarized political system often have a more 
inefficient tax structure and rely heavily on seigniorage. Political instability, also, is 
positively related to the amount of seigniorage (Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini 1992; 
Davies 2007). 
Because of the just-said, there seems to be, at least, three common measures of 
seigniorage (Drazan 1985). Firstly, the change in the monetary base, that is the currency 
and central bank deposits that together provide the base for the money supply under 
fractional reserve banking. Secondly, the interest earned by investing resources obtained 
by the past issuance of base money in interest-bearing assets. And thirdly, the inflation 
tax (Buiter 2007). It depends on the situation which concept we have to use. In periods of 
high inflation, when the rate of inflation dominates real growth, most seigniorage is 
generated as inflation tax. The third concept of measuring seigniorage applies. When 
inflation is relatively low and interest rates are determined by the market, it is the second, 
opportunity cost based, concept that makes the most sense. In cases where the central 
bank is integrated with the government and where the government finances itself directly 
by deciding on the amount of new banknotes or monetary base issued each period, the 
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first concept is the most useful (Hochreiter and Rovelli 2002). This is mainly the case of 
central banks in smaller and poorer economies (Ize 2007). 
Since we are interested in the fiscal aspect of seigniorage, we look at the just-
described second concept of seigniorage (Schobert 2001). Seigniorage consists of the 
proceeds of the investments of over 800 billion euro: the amount of euro banknotes in 
circulation in the eurozone in 2010. At present, the proceeds flow to the National Central 
Banks (NCBs) of the Member States and the European Central Bank (ECB) that make up 
the Eurosystem. In the end, the proceeds go to the national governments of the countries 
of the eurozone.2  
 
VERITABLE OWN RESOURCES AND SEIGNIORAGE  
 
In 2006, the EU agreed on a full, wide-ranging review without taboos of EU spending 
and revenue. With the current reliance on contributions from Member States and the 
accompanying ubiquitous just retour thinking; there is no room for policies with a real 
added value for the EU. More really own resources may solve this problem. In addition, 
the EU wants to create a more visible bond with its citizens. Own EU taxes according to 
the European Commission will attain both ends. It will increase the financial autonomy of 
the European Union and create a direct bond of citizens with the EU institutions.  
In the seventies of the last century, the Union, indeed, had its own true resources 
in the form of customs duties, agricultural levies and a percentage of a harmonized tax 
base of the value-added tax (VAT) in the Member States. National payments, as they 
were agreed to finance the EU during the transition period directly after the founding of 
the EU in 1957, temporarily disappeared from the scene. From the beginning of this 
century, however, national contributions finance again, at present for 85 percent, the EU 
budget. They consist of contributions by the Member States based on their Gross 
National Product (GNP). In total, the EU budget is limited to about one percent of the 
GNP of the Member States. For 2012 the revenues and expenses of the EU, the budget 
has to be in balance, are € 129 billion. On the list of the new proposed EU taxes by the 
Commission, are six taxing possibilities: (1) taxation of the financial sector; (2) revenues 
from auctioning under the greenhouse gas Emissions Trading System; (3) a charge 
related to air transport; (4) VAT; (5) energy tax; and (6) corporate income tax (European 
Commission, 2010a, Technical Annexes). The European Commission, however, 
emphasizes that there are certainly other taxing possibilities. In its latest communication 
the Commission (2011a) did select a financial transaction tax (FTT) and a European VAT 
as the two most likely candidates for a Euro tax.  
For a long time, seigniorage, also, has been mentioned as a possible new own 
resource (Begg et al. 2008; Catoir 2004; European Commission 1998, 2004; European 
Parliament 1997). In the famous Sapir rapport (2003) on the future of the Union (Making 
the EU Economic System Deliver) seigniorage was stated as an example of a revenue 
with a clear EU dimension rather than those taxes with an obvious national label. 
Revenues with an EU dimension, were described as to either be related to an EU policy 
so that they cannot be meaningfully be reapportioned nationally or have a very mobile tax 
bases within the EU. On principle, they should directly accrue to the Union. The rapport 
stated that even a partial allocation of seigniorage to the EU budget would be sufficient to 
cover the financing needs of the Union (Sapir 2003: 165). In 2001 for the Eurosystem, it 
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was estimated to be about 10 billion euro (Catoir 2004).3 At present an estimate is that it 
is on average about 50 billion of essentially free money for the Union (Buiter 2010: 18). 
In the short run, seigniorage revenues can be volatile since they depend on the demand 
for cash balances and prevailing interest rates. Both are notably affected by the business 
cycle.4 Begg et al. (2008) estimate that seigniorage could provide between 4 percent and 
40 percent of the annual budget of the EU. Over time, the revenues are more stable and 
are about 0.25 percent of GNP (Heinemann, Mohl and Osterloh 2008). In the future, 
however, changes in payments habits and the generalized use of electronic means of 
payments, the rising cashless payment practices, might erode the tax bases (Vergote et al. 
2010: 21) On the other hand, the future development of the euro as an international 
currency may contribute to seigniorage through increased circulation of banknotes 
outside the euro area. In the case of the U.S., about half of the dollar bills are used outside 
the U.S (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2006). 
In more recent studies, however, seigniorage has more or less disappeared. The 
main reasons cited are that not all Member States do participate in the eurozone, the 
revenues should be small and volatile, and institutional opposition from especially the 
ECB (European Commission 2011b). 
To sum up, in history there are two fundamental reasons given for assigning 
seigniorage to the Union. First, it is a veritable new own resource; it is clearly linked to a 
fully developed key European policy. In the history of the EU, the introduction of the 
euro in 2002 is a new common EU policy on par with the introduction of the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the one internal market. The revenue that the eurozone 
raises by printing money is not simply the result of adding-up the seigniorage the 
Member States generated before with their own currencies. Most currencies did not have 
the status of an international reserve currency. A status, the euro, at present, has. The euro 
is a sui generis result of an EU policy. Seigniorage also is a candidate for the new, 
policy-driven, own resource the EU is looking for (European Union 2009: 29).  
The second reasons for assigning seigniorage to the Union is that there is in an 
integrated currency area, no obvious key for apportioning seigniorage revenues to 
Member States. Just as the custom duties collected at EU ports do not belong to the 
Member States in which the ports are situated. Seigniorage, also, is an equivalent of the 
Rotterdam-Antwerp effect for custom duties. In short, it can, as has been said for these 
reasons, only be a matter of time before these revenues are assigned to the EU (Begg and 





The EU has developed criteria to assess new own resources (Begg et al. 2008; European 
Commission 1998 and 2004; European Parliament 2007). The problem is that the EU 
uses more than a dozen criteria. The criteria can be rubricated as budgetary: sufficiency, 
stability; efficiency: visibility, operating costs, efficient allocation of resources; equity: 
horizontal and vertical, fair contributions of the Member States; and political: will 
consensus be possible among the Member States?, will the fiscal sovereignty of the 
Member States be maintained?, does an EU tax create a Leviathan?5 Criteria, the 
European Commission also has to add-up somehow for an overall result. The problem is 
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not only, which is of course an open door, and the EU is well aware of, that no tax can 
fulfill all the, often contradicting, criteria. Nevertheless, the quality of the legislation 
remains a problem. Quality is next to being a matter of legality (Voermans 2009a)6 also 
related to the legislative process (Radaelli 2004; Voermans 2009b).7 We have to consider 
how the social process and pertaining content are guaranteed: did all parties participate in 
the process and can the expectations be fulfilled. These qualities are impossible to fulfill 
with the shopping list of criteria. The probable result is an ad hoc political choice; the 
spur of the moment will decide on the chosen EU tax.  
As an example of the just-said we can look at the by the European Union stated 
most important characteristic of the visibility of the new EU tax to the EU citizens. With 
an EU tax, for the Union, a direct link between citizens and the EU should be established. 
Over the years, the Union has evolved from a bond between states to a bond between 
states and the citizens thereof. An EU tax should be the expression of this idea. Visibility, 
also, is emphasized in the assessment criteria of a new EU tax. Just as José Manuel 
Barroso in Political Guidelines for the next Commission (2009: 36) says that we need to 
“find a more efficient and transparent way of financing EU policies”; at present the 
revenues of the EU are “a confusing and opaque mix of contributions and rebates”. A 
reason, also, not to assign seigniorage to the Union is its invisibility for EU citizens. A 
reason, seigniorage shares with the at present by the Union most preferred financial 
transaction tax (FTT).8 Of a FTT, it is unclear who in the end does pay and it does not 
create a direct visible bond between the EU and the citizens. It is chosen, as to be 
expected, with an ad hoc argument: to let the financial sector pay for its part in causing 
the financial crises in 2008.The opinion, however, if invisibility really is a disadvantage 
differs. Begg and Grimwade (1998: 135), e.g., mention that because the tax is an implicit 
one, it may be politically easier for Member States to assign the tax to the EU than in the 
case of other more overt taxes.9 In fact, of all the proposed EU taxes only an EU VAT, 
visible on every receipt, will be clearly visible to every EU citizen.  
 
 
ON THE POSITIVE SITE: UNIQUE EU CHARACTER, SUBSTANTIONAL 
REVENUE, AND LOW (FRAUD-FREE) COLLECTION COSTS  
 
Several characteristics of seigniorage do make it a prime candidate for a new EU tax. 
First, a unique policy-driven common EU policy does generate seigniorage. In addition, 
since monetary policy within the euro area is an exclusive competence of the EU (Begg 
et al. 2008), the justification of transferring this revenue to the EU level is straightforward. 
For the EU, seigniorage, as far as it depends on currency in circulation, is based on the 
production of euro banknotes.10 In the EU, 17 of the 27 Member States of the Union 
participate in the Eurosystem. All EU Member States, except England and Denmark, 
have to, when ready and fulfilling the criteria, join the eurozone. All who belong to the 
monetary union share the same banknotes, which freely flow form one country to another 
and outside the monetary union. The revenues stemming from these banknotes are 
difficult to allocate on a purely national basis. In other words, there is a problem of 
regional arbitrariness in the distribution of the proceeds. It is a common good of the 
Member States taking part in the Union (Cattoir 2004; Hansen and King 2007; Stojanović 
2006).  
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Second, seigniorage in the EU is based on the revenues of the euro notes in 
circulation. At present the total value of the notes in circulation is over € 800 billion. It 
seems also safe, as shown before, to estimate the revenues from seigniorage to be, on 
average, about 0.25 percent of the total GNP of the Union, i.c. of the overall EU 
revenues.11 At this moment the amount of seigniorage as generated by the euro is, of 
course, not at its maximum. This, as far as, only 17 of the 27 Member States participate 
in the eurozone. Mutatis mutandis it could also grow, with nearly all Member States 
participating (Hochreiter and Rovelli 2002), to about a third of the EU budget. In sum, 
seigniorage could also generate about a quarter till a third of the EU budget (Lang 2008). 
Combined with the revenues from custom duties, it would finance about half of the EU 
budget. It is also in line with an other explicit goal of the Commission to finance half of 
the budget with true own resources (European Commission 2004).  
If seigniorage would flow to the Union, that would not leave the ECB and NCBs 
without means.12 As said before, they would keep the revenues from the trade in 
international currencies, interstate payments, monitoring functions and real estate. 
Especially central banks with private shareholders undertake these last activities to lure 
private shareholders (Rösl 2002). Though of course the ECB and the NCBs can also keep 
a part of the seigniorage revenues as handling costs in view of spending for their currency 
function. Just like, at present, Member States retain part of the collected custom duties as 
handling costs.  
Third, a great advantage of seigniorage, that no other of the proposed EU taxes 
can match, is that it has very low collection costs and possibilities for fraud.13 The 
number of collection points are limited to the number of NCBs which use the euro and 
the ECB.14 Fraud should be non-existent due to the transparency of Central Banks 
activities. For, e.g., an EU VAT however, fraud in the different Member States would be 
a real problem. Next to a FTT, a EU VAT is at the moment the preferred new EU tax by 
the European Commission (2011a). We must doubt if equity will exist between the 
citizens in the different Member States; tax morality and the quality of national tax 
administrations differ too much. Consumers in some Member States will pay the EU 
VAT; other consumers will not pay (Schneider 2007).  
  
ON THE NEGATIVE SITE: INSTITUTIONAL, LEGAL, AND PRACTICAL 
PROBLEMS  
 
An institutional/political problem for seigniorage is that the autonomy of the ECB seems 
to be threatened: not only, as is presently the case, monetary policy but fiscal policy too 
could become an aim of the ECB.15  As a result, the monetary goal of the ECB, to 
maintain price stability, would be in danger. In other words, in the eyes of the NCBs and 
the ECB, though the financial autonomy of the EU increases for the central banks it 
decreases. At least it looks that way. In the eyes of the NCBs, seigniorage is a long run 
reliable income source that helps central banks to maintain their financial independence 
(Vergote et al. 2010). For that reason the ECB and NCBs are traditionally firmly opposed 
to the proposal (European Commission 2011b). The argument, however, looks like a 
sophism. We are looking at the monetary income of the ECB to the European Union. We 
are not discussing the volte face that the European Union pays to the ECB. The situation 
arising when seigniorage goes to the EU is basically not different as it was before the 
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introduction of the euro: the NCBs had to give seigniorage directly to their central 
governments, respectively the private shareholders. The financial and operational 
autonomy of the ECB remains the same (Begg et al. 2008; cp. Buchanan 2004).  
Moreover, there are other means to ensure the autonomy of the ECB (Scheller 
2006). To attain that goal, the Treaty of Lisbon contains several explicit provisions. The 
directors of the ECB can, for several reasons, behave independently of national 
politicians and the members of the European Parliament. Firstly, the directors of the ECB 
and the presidents of the NCBs have a tenure of eight respectively five years. The tenure 
lasts longer than the political cycle. Secondly, the requirement that the directors of the 
ECB have to be persons of known reputation and experience on monetary business and 
the banking sector has the same result. Mostly those people who get positions do not have 
to think, given their age, of a job after they stop working at the ECB. Thirdly, members 
of the ECB are explicitly forbidden, as it is written in the Treaty of Lisbon, Protocol No.4, 
to ask for or receive advice from other EU institutions or national politicians. These last 
institutions have to obey to the same principle.16  
The just-described situation of autonomy of the ECB is probably also the reason 
that Member States gave up relatively easily part of their sovereignty on the subject of 
monetary policy. But there are other differences too. There is a direct link with citizens in 
view of fiscal policy which is absent in view of monetary policy. In addition, the 
credibility of the ECB is believed to be greater than the institutions of the Union. Hence, 
there is more trust in transferring sovereignty to them. The NCBs also play a direct role 
in the ECB. The interplay between national parliaments and the European Parliament is 
less direct and not that harmonious (Negrescu 2008). The EP and Counsil, also miss 
essential characteristics---they are even enlarged---to make rational decisions in view of 
taxation. In the EP the national interest often prevails over the much weaker ideological 
bond in the parties. It is also a fact that what Members States or the Council tell and write 
in official documents is not the same as what they really think and hence do not give a 
truthful picture of the situation (Clasper and Thurston 2010).  
From a legal point of view, a solution has to be found in view of the different 
legal structures of the NCBs. In most Member States the state is the only shareholder of 
the National Central Bank. In Belgium, Austria and Italy, however, there are only, or next 
to the state. also private shareholders. All shareholders have a claim to the dividend and 
hence to the seigniorage of the NCB. Those private shareholders must be compensated. 
Because, however, in these cases the national governments already take, before the 
overall profit is determined, the part based on seigniorage beforehand out of the overall 
profit, the compensation will not be exceptionally high. In addition, there has to be a 
change in the statutes of the European Central Bank. The statute, art 33.1 (b), obliges that 
the seigniorage is to be shared with the NCBs. The NCBs and the ECB, as said before, 
would not be without income. They still do have their other sources of income.  
  Finally, a practical solution has to be found for those Member States that do not, 
out of principle or yet, use the euro.17 Seigniorage would involve, for most Member 
States a temporary two-tier mechanism. A different treatment would be imposed on 
eurozone and non-eurozone Member States in the financing of the EU budget (European 
Commission 2011b). In the literature, two suggestions are made to handle this problem. 
A simple solution would be to let the Member States outside the eurozone pay according 
to their GNP. The overall ECB seigniorage is to be deducted from the GNP contributions 
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of the Members of the eurozone. So the other EU Member States pay the GNP 
contributions in full (Heinemann, Mohl, and Osterloh 2008: 107). If this solution is 
chosen there will be winners and losers among the existing members of the eurozone. 
Poorer member states will loose, though not much. No country would pay more than 10 
percent extra. At present they receive more seigniorage from the ECB by way of the 
payments of the ECB to their NCBs than they save on their national contribution to the 
EU (Heinemann, Mohl, and Osterloh 2008).  
Goulard and Nava (2002: 50) give a more complicated proposal. Member States 
not yet participating in the common monetary policy18 should pay a share of their GDP, 
which is calculated by a formula constituted of a linear combination of the share of the 
ECB seigniorage in the GDP of the eurozone and the share of the country’s central 
bank’s profits in the country’s GDP.19 The weighting of both parts would be a political 
decision. As the central banks outside the eurozone usually, as it has been in the past, 
generate higher profits due to higher inflation, a higher waiting of the second part would 
increase the contributions of those countries.  
 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
Based on a proposal of the European Commission (2011a), after June 2011 the European 
Union started the process of decision making on the multiannual financial framework for 
the period 2014-2020. A new own resource furnished by an EU tax is one of the goals. 
Next to the by the European Commission favored financial transaction tax (FTT) and EU 
VAT, seigniorage could, as discussed in this paper, be a possible new revenue of the 
Union. Seigniorage is the monetary income of the Eurosystem.  
The introduction of seigniorage as a new EU resource is, however, no one-way 
bet. On the one hand, it can on average raise, fraud-free and with almost no collection 
costs, a substantional part of the EU budget. Seigniorage also really belongs to the Union 
since it is generated by a unique, policy-driven common EU policy. On the other hand it 
does not create a visible bond between the EU and its citizens (Gros 2008), and it faces 
stiff institutional opposition form the NCBs and ECB. What could tip the balance in favor 
of seigniorage is that one of the main obstacles to the introduction of all the other 
proposed EU taxes: the loss of the fiscal sovereignty of the Member States is not relevant 
for seigniorage.20 The Member States did already give up their national sovereignty in 
view of monetary policy with the introduction of the euro.  
To conclude, for a new EU revenue it seems to be a realizable possibility to go 
back to almost square one of modern monetary history: seigniorage. This may be for no 
stronger reason then by the default of the other proposed EU taxes. As was said by John 
Maynard Keynes, “A government can live by this means when it can live by no other. It 
is the form of taxation which the public find hardest to evade and even the weakest 
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1 The Federal Reserve paid in 2005, 5.7 cent for each note, whatever the denomination, for printing and 
delivering to the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP). In the U.S., about 33 million notes are daily 
produced with a face value of about 529 million dollar (Karmin 2008). 
2 It is, however, an open question how much and when the seigniorage revenues are distributed from the 
NCBs to their national governments (Ize 2007). 
3  Total central bank profits were estimated to be about 25 billion. Next to profits related to seigniorage, 
central banks also generate profits, and losses, based on monetary policy operations, foreign exchange 
operations, advisory activities, economic research, and the proceeds of investments in real-estate (Rösl 
2002). 
4 At this moment, for instance, the interest rate of the Eurosystem’s main refinancing operations (the so-
called refi rate), the rate the ECB gets as the proceeds of its allotted quantity of euro notes, is about one 
percent. This, however, is from a historic point of view exceptionally low and is related to the present 
policy to stimulate the economy after the late-2000s global financial crisis. From 2007 till 2009 the refi 
rate was, for instance, 4 percent. For an estimate of seigniorage in several Eastern Europe EU Member 
States see Kun (2003) and Hochreiter and Rovelli (2002). In general it is above the seigniorage in the 
eurozone.  
5  Though it could be maintained as well that the EU budged is just the oil that makes other more 
important decisions possible (Figueira 2008). 
6 In this paper we do not discuss the question if the European Parliament is a real parliament and hence 
if it is from that point of view safe to give it a taxing power (cp. Bustin 1972; Klaus 2009). 
7 See the ongoing Better Regulation project initiated by the European Commission in 2001 
(http://ec.europa.eu/governance/better_regulation/transp_eu_law_en.htm). 
8 At present, the by the EU most preferred EU tax is a (FTT). Of a FTT, however, it is unclear who in 
the end does pay and it does not create a direct visible bond between the EU and the citizens. It is 
chosen, as to be expected, with an ad hoc argument: to let the financial sector pay for its part in causing 
the financial crises in 2008. 
 14
                                                                                                                                                 
9 It is also fair to say that the EU shows courage. With an EU tax, citizens have to pay directly to the 
Union.  For centuries the ultimate goal and wisdom of governments was to collect taxes from its 
citizens as invisible as possible. Indirect taxes not direct taxes were to be preferred. The current 
financing represents  the old ideal. As said before, customs duties provide 15% of the budget and the 
remainder roughly comes from direct contributions of the Member States. The contribution depends on 
the Gross Domestic Product of the Member State. Both revenues are unrelated to daily life. 
10 The governments of the Member States are still in charge, and do get the gains, of the production of 
euro coins, the other form of currency in circulation. 
11 This estimate would be in line with a recent estimate for the seigniorage given by The Bank of Canada 
(2010) (cp. Neumann 1992). In Canada, for the most commonly used 20-dollar bill, the revenues 
minus all the costs, is about 95 dollar cents each year. This is also a return of about 4 percent. For the 
Union this equals about a quarter of the EU budget. The low estimates of the European Commission 
(2011b) of seigniorage as supplying only a small part of the EU budget are, first, the result of looking 
at the present situation of exceptional low interest rates (compare note 4) and, second, not taking into 
account the seigniorage of those Member States who are not yet a part of the eurozone (compare note 
5). 
12 Compare note 3. 
13 See, e.g., what would be the case if some of the other proposed EU taxes would be introduced. For  
then what to do with the difference in the quality of national tax collection? In some countries no doubt 
the part of the, e.g., VAT belonging to the EU would be collected, but in other countries this would 
certainly not be the case. Some EU citizens would pay and others would not. 
14 A legal point to be taken care of is that the European Court of Auditors must be able to audit the   
contribution of the NCBs and the ECB to the European Union. An option they do not have at present. 
15 It is of course another thing to maintain that this already did happen. In helping Member States with 
their debt the ECB is said to have crossed the line between monetary and fiscal policy (Ruparel and 
Persson 2011). 
16 It is of course another thing to maintain that these safeguards are working all of the times. In helping 
Member States with their debt the ECB is said to have crossed the line between monetary and fiscal 
policy (Ruparel and Persson 2011). 
17 It is emphasized that this paper looks at seigniorage as a new own resource for the EU. It does not look 
at the gains and losses Member States incur when introducing the euro. For estimates thereof see e.g. 
Gros 2004; Heinemann et al. 2008; Sinn and Feist 1997, 2000; cp. Bogetić 1999; Hansen and King 
2007). 
18 Every Member State is obliged to join the eurozone. Till now all new members have to join the 
eurozone when ready for it. Only England and Denmark do have an opt-out option, which until now 
they do use.  
19 In general Goulard and Nava (2002) do estimate the revenues of seigniorage between 0.2 and 0.3 
percent of the GNP of the Union. 
20 The whole discussion of EU taxes is closely linked to the battle between the extremes of those want to 
create the European Union as a super state and those who see the Union as no more than a free trade 
area (Begg 2011; Mutén 2001). 
